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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
2	SOUTHERN DIVISION
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
5	Plaintiff,
6	v. CASE NO: 1:19-CR-118
7	AARON WILLIAM FEIN,
8	Defendant.
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12	SENTENCING HEARING
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15	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE PAUL L. MALONEY United States District Judge
16	Kalamazoo, Michigan March 4, 2020
17	March 4, 2020
18	APPEARANCES:
19	APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:
20	NILS KESSLER Assistant United States Attorney
21	P.O. Box 208 Grand Rapids, Michigan 49501-0208
22	APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT:
23	JAMES STEVENSON FISHER
24	Federal Public Defender 50 Louis Street, N.W., Suite 300
25	Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503-2633

1 Kalamazoo, Michigan 2 March 4, 2020 3 at approximately 9:05 a.m. PROCEEDINGS 4 THE COURT: This is File Number 19-118; The United 09:05:59 5 6 States of America vs. Aaron Fein. This matter is before the 7 Court for sentencing. The Court's file reflects that on July 19, 2019, 8 9 the defendant pled guilty before this Judge to false statement, contrary to 18 U.S. Code 1001(a)(2). The Court 09:06:16 10 11 accepts the plea agreement finding the charges pled to 12 adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense behavior. The Court's presentence officer scored this case at 13 14 Offense Level 13, Criminal History Category I, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 12 to 18 months. 09:06:38 15 16 defendant has two objections to the scoring of the 17 quidelines, which the Court will address momentarily, after 18 argument from the parties. 19 The record should reflect that Assistant United 09:06:53 20 States Attorney Nils Kessler represents the government. 21 Attorney James Fisher represents the defendant. 22 defendant is present in person. 23 Mr. Fisher, have you had ample opportunity, sir, of 24 reviewing the pre-sentence report with your client? 09:07:05 25 MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor.

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                      THE COURT: Subject to your objections, do you
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             concur that the guideline range is 12 to 18 months?
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                      MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor.
                      THE COURT: Thank you.
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                      Mr. Fein, is that true, sir? You've had ample
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             opportunity of reviewing the presentence report with your
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             lawyer?
                      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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                      THE COURT: And are you satisfied with his work and
             representation of you?
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                      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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                      THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
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                      Mr. Kessler, do you concur in the advisory
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             quideline range?
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                      MR. KESSLER: I do, your Honor.
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                      THE COURT: Are you moving third level?
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                      MR. KESSLER: Yes, your Honor.
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                      THE COURT: That motion is granted. That does not
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             change the advisory guideline range, because the Court
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             anticipated the making of the motion, and the Court's
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             granting of it. Of course, that's all subject to the
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             objections.
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                      So with that, Mr. Fisher, your objections, sir. Go
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             ahead.
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                      MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor. As I've outlined in
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my objection letter and in my sentencing memorandum, we do have the two objections as noted by the Court.

The first one, the 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) enhancement for violation of the prior specific judicial or administrative order injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in this guidelines enhancement.

As I noted in my objection letter and in our sentencing memorandum, the notes that accompany this portion of the sentencing guidelines appear to indicate, and the caselaw I think would support the argument that I've made here, which is that the violation actually has to be the criminal conduct, not just some lengthy established offense conduct that's defined here, but the actual crime itself. And the cases that would support that I've cited in my There are no cases that support an interpretation like this and, in fact, I couldn't find a single case addressing this enhancement 401.001 violation, so we don't have much in the way of precedent to go on here. What we do have is cases that show that the application applied in fraud cases where a court specifically ordered somebody not to do the thing that was the crime. And in the case, I believe it was Johnston, that was phen phen cases from several years ago out of Kentucky, in this case, the Court had ordered the defendant to disburse a settlement and he devised an artifice to defraud the very object of the

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Court's order.

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In <u>Ramer</u>, the same issue applied. The offense involved the violation of a prior temporary restraining order in this case. Here we have a Probate Court ordering Mr. Fein not to use or possess firearms he temporarily possessed firearms. That Court order is not the false statement here. So we have a distinction here in the case that I think is a meaningful one, and the application notes would seem to suggest that this applies to a specific fraud on the Court rather than merely violating any Court order at any time during the relevant conduct involved in the case.

THE COURT: There is nothing in the text of the guideline that limits this enhancement to just fraud cases, is there?

MR. FISHER: I would agree with that, your Honor.

And I understand we are out on a bit of a unique ledge here, there is not much in the way of precedent to define the issue.

THE COURT: That's true. Okay. Thank you, sir.

MR. FISHER: The next issue--

THE COURT: Let's do them one at a time.

Mr. Kessler, on this objection, go ahead, sir.

MR. KESSLER: Yes, your Honor.

I think that you just touched on what is the most important part, is that the plain language of the

enhancement says you get two levels if the offense involved a violation of a prior judicial order. And involved, I think, is the most important word there.

As to the two sub-arguments here; first, that it applies only to financial fraud, the language means what it says, and it doesn't say financial in there and the language itself of the enhancement doesn't use the word fraud either. I understand that there are cases where it is applied to financial fraud cases, that's no surprise, but none of those say that it applies only to financial fraud cases.

I think it's important that the sentencing commission, acting as an arm of Congress here, indexed the 1001 crime to Section 2B1.1, which means they meant for this guideline to apply to 1001 cases, and that implies that they meant for all the possible enhancements under 2B1.1 to apply to these cases. They know how to say otherwise if they mean to say otherwise, and they didn't.

THE COURT: 2B is a, to use a pejorative term, a great garbage bin for a lot of offense of convictions.

MR. KESSLER: It is.

THE COURT: When to a certain extent I think the original sentencing commission couldn't figure out where to put them--

MR. KESSLER: I like to think of it as a multi-tool as opposed to a garbage bin.

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THE COURT: As a result of that, there are all kinds of factual scenarios involved in the application of this particular guideline. But you would agree with Mr. Fisher, and Mr. Fisher argues, of course, that most of the caselaw involves financial crimes, for obvious reasons, because that's where financial crimes go.

MR. KESSLER: I do agree. And I also agree that I

was not able to find any cases where it was actually applied to this, but that doesn't mean that it shouldn't or that it can't.

And as to the second part of the, you know, argument that Mr. Fisher is making, essentially saying that the lying itself had to be the violation of the order, but that again, is not what the plain language says. It says that the offense of conviction had to involve a violation of the prior judicial order. He is lying about shooting a gun and about having a gun, and having guns is what the prior judicial order was about. It involved having guns. I think it's important for to us look at what the purpose of this is, and it actually spells it out in that same application note; the purpose of this enhancement is to recognize that a defendant who fails to comply with such order demonstrates aggravated criminal intent. So we have to ask ourselves if that is the issue in this case, and I would say it is here. A defendant like Mr. Fein who was not under a prior judicial

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order not to have guns, would be less culpable than somebody 1 2 who did what he did. A judge told him you can't have guns. 3 After a mental health evaluation, they basically said this is dangerous, you should not have guns, and he went out and 4 5 got guns, and was shooting them, and was trying to make one 09:13:13 in his own ^ house ^ how is ^ how's, and then he lied about 6 7 it. And that is clearly involved in the offense. THE COURT: Mr. Fisher? 8 9 MR. FISHER: Briefly, your Honor. 09:13:23 10 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 11 MR. FISHER: In terms of precedent, I would also--12 I didn't do this in my memo, but I would point to the opinion that I attached to this case where 1001 was the 13 count of conviction. The Stone case that I've referenced in 14 09:13:37 15 my memo. In that case, there was no application of this 16 particular enhancement where I think it would apply. There 17 were several judicial orders in that case that were violated 18 during the pendency of that case, and the government in that 19 case, did not argue for the enhancement. So we do have some 09:13:49 20 precedent that that application of that enhancement 2.1 shouldn't apply even when there are direct prior judicial 22 orders during the pendency of a case. That would be my 23 response argument. 24 The other argument I would have is there are

several sections in 2B1.1 that I don't think can reasonably

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apply to the context of a false statement to a law enforcement officer. If the law exceeded \$550 million these are all clearly defined as financial issues. I think the Court has identified the problem we have with 2B1.1 cases, is the guidelines don't specifically address this case or this kind of conduct.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I certainly concur with that. And the use of the 2B1.1 guideline in this particular circumstance doesn't quite fit, and the Court is left with applying the guideline as it is. Based on the facts of the case, this is obviously a fact intensive analysis that's required here.

I'm going to overrule the defendant's objection on this objection. The Sentencing Commission prescribed the guideline for 2B1.1 for violations of 1001, which is the count and crime of conviction. Therefore, in the absence of authority to the contrary, it's presumed that the guideline applies to this case, not just financial crimes, as the defendant has suggested. Recognizing, of course, Mr. Fisher is absolutely accurate, that most of the caselaw involved here is in the context of financial crimes.

Further, the application note supports the application of the enhancement to this scenario. The application note states that the enhancement should apply if a defendant commits a fraud in contravention of a judicial

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order. Fraud by definition includes the knowing concealment of material fact. That's Black's Law Dictionary 11th Edition 2019.

In this case, the offense conduct, the defendant made a material false statement to conceal his possession of firearms, which was conduct prohibited by the judicial order. Accordingly, the Court finds that the guidance from the application note lends itself to the ultimate application of this particular enhancement. Accordingly, the objection to this enhancement, which is Paragraph 55 is overruled.

And now let's move to 56. Go ahead, Mr. Fisher.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I think we are a little bit on stronger footing with this objection. Probation, I think, included this enhancement for the possession of a firearm in connection with the offense, and the guidelines provided for, "If the offense involved possession of a dangerous weapon including a firearm in connection with the offense." We don't have any defining language in 2B1.1, but we do have defining language of "in connection with" in other parts of the guidelines. And in caselaw that's developed dealing with that in the context of firearms in drug cases. What we have there is the gun has to somehow facilitate, augment, or encourage, or induce, or embolden the person to commit the underlying offense. Here the gun

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1 was possessed at a shooting range a day before the false 2 statement was made. There's absolutely no way that he could 3 have been emboldened by the possession of the firearm. facts themselves don't support that he was emboldened, 4 5 encouraged, induced or in any way emboldened to make a false 09:17:25 statement. 6 7 The recording we played during the motion to 8

suppress, if the Court recalls, is profuse with Mr. Fein's essentially begging that he not go back to a mental health facility. The false statement here was designed specifically to help him in that narrow sense avoid being sent to a mental health facility again. There is no indication whatsoever the gun assisted or facilitated that false statement or any false statement in this case.

So when you look at the lack of definition in 2B1.1 and the definitions that we do have in the other sections of the guidelines, there has to be some sort of nexus between the actual crime and the gun, not merely that the lie or false statement of a fraud was about a firearm, but that it actually encouraged, induced, facilitated, or otherwise emboldened the defendant to commit the crime itself. We just don't have that here. The application, I believe, is clearly inapplicable.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Kessler.

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MR. KESSLER: Yes, your Honor.

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I think we are going through the same exercise here where we have to go back again first to looking at the specific words of what the enhancement says, and it says "in connection," not facilitating. And Congress and the Sentencing Commission know how to say facilitating if they mean it. So what we have here is trying to interpret it based on some caselaw, and I grant there is a case at least, the Gibbs case, from out of circuit where it applied it in a case where it was facilitating. And even if you read Gibbs to say it had to facilitate, Gibbs itself recognized that there are other circuits that disagree. For example, in the Bennett case, the Court specifically came out and said it does not have to facilitate it. So I don't think that you can read it into the language just because you want to. I think the best example that I was able to find of an example where it clearly didn't have to facilitate it was the Greig case, which as Mr. Fisher pointed out when we were talking about it before, actually involved Whitey Bulger case. hadn't noticed it the first time I looked at it. But the facts of that one are interesting in that the defendant was Whitey Bulger's girlfriend, and she was convicted of harboring Whitey Bulger, and the enhancement applied even though she didn't have guns, Whitey Bulger had guns. Now, you can argue that having guns emboldened and facilitated

Whitey Bulger in staying hidden, or in fighting off the police if they had come to find him, for example, but they didn't facilitate his girlfriend harboring him or hiding him. The fact is, the Court said, they were connected to the offense. So I agree with Mr. Fisher, there has to be a nexus, and there is a nexus.

THE COURT: Isn't that somewhat like a fortress theory though? I mean I apply fortress theory possession of weapons in drug houses all the time. In this case, we have got— in the Whitey Bulger case, we have got possession of a firearm at a place where a fugitive is being lodged, correct?

MR. KESSLER: Agreed. And it's a necessary, but not sufficient— or sufficient but not necessary condition. For Whitey Bulger, yes, you could say it furthered his crime, but I'm not seeing how it would have furthered his girlfriend's crime in not telling the police where he was. It was connected to it is the issue. Again, you go back to what is the intent of the people who wrote this enhancement, and it's to recognize that somebody who brings a firearm to some other sort of crime is making it more serious. The guidelines are all concerned, not like with a 924(c) where you're trying to decide whether a statute applies. The guideline are concerned with determining what is an appropriate sentence. And so this enhancement is there to

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1 say, you know, when somebody brings a gun to another crime, 2 they are more culpable. They are more dangerous. It has to 3 be taken into account in setting what the guideline range 4 is. And in that case, yes, there was a nexus, but it wasn't in furtherance. 5 09:21:07 6 I don't know if you want me to address there's--7 If you have other questions on that. 8 THE COURT: No, go ahead. 9 MR. KESSLER: I want to touch on, and Mr. Fisher didn't talk about it here at the podium, but it's in the 09:21:17 10 11 sentencing memorandum, so I wanted to touch on the other 12 part of it. And if the defense is withdrawing this, I can cut it short. There was an issue about whether it was 13 actually a firearm that he had. I don't know if the 14 09:21:31 15 defendant is persisting with that, at least in the 16 sentencing objection. 17 MR. FISHER: Just to clarify. That has to do with 18 Count Two that was dismissed in exchange for the plea. 19 was more relevant conduct than this specific allegation. 09:21:44 20 MR. KESSLER: If there isn't really any argument--2.1 THE COURT: I think the gun we are talking about is 22 the gun at the firing range in Ann Arbor, correct? 23 MR. KESSLER: Well, there is both. The one--2.4 are both relevant conduct, whether it's dismissed or not. 09:21:58 25 And the caselaw is pretty clear on that.

1 The one he was firing in Ann Arbor, clearly a 2 firearm. On video you could see him shooting it. 3 extent there's any argument about the other one, it may not be a firearm for regulatory purposes, and I'll just put on 4 5 the record that I talked with Brian Lutke, who the Court 09:22:12 6 might remember from past cases, he used to be an agent here, 7 and he's in charge of the National Firearms Center now in West Virginia. I sent him pictures of this gun, and he 8 9 agreed, it's the lower receiver in the unmilled state that it's in would not be a firearm for regulatory purposes. But 09:22:27 10 11 for quideline purposes, it could be readily converted into a 12 weapon, and it says so right on the box. It says that with tools that you can find around your house you could make 13 14 this into a functional weapon in under an hour. And this defendant we know has an engineering degree, and has 09:22:42 15 16 probably more skill and ability to do that than the average 17 So it doesn't sound like we are really arguing about bear. 18 that. 19 I don't know if the Court had anything else on 09:22:53 20 that. 21 Thank you. THE COURT: I do not. 22 MR. KESSLER: Thank you, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Fisher, anything else on this 2.4 issue? Go ahead, sir. 09:22:57 25 MR. FISHER: Just to clarify a couple points.

Fein's engineering degree is in industrial engineering, which is more properly defined as efficiency and processes involving people rather than machinery. I think that's an important distinction to make.

To address the government's argument about the firearms parts. I don't think that something that can be milled by a person with limited expertise or skill in a manufacturing process meets the definition of readily convertible, which is why I didn't even bother addressing it with the Court. I think it's sort of a tertiary issue to what we are dealing with here. What I think primary issue, the possession of the firearm I think the primary issue is the possession of the firearm, and I think Mr. Kessler's statement is indicative of our position, Mr. Fein did not bring this gun to the crime. The crime came to the gun, and the government's trying to put the cart before the horse and say that this is all part and parcel of the same thing, when The crime occurred after the possession of the gun, not before it or not during it, and therefore, the application shouldn't apply to these facts.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. FISHER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: This is again an issue which our circuit has not addressed. Other circuits in other contexts have addressed this particular issue. But in the Court's

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judgment, application of this enhancement is a bridge too 1 2 I'm going to sustain the defendant's objection to the 3 application of 2B1.1(b)(16)(B). The Court recognizes contrary authority in other circuits, but for purposes in 4 the fact-bound analysis of this particular case, the Court 5 09:24:38 feels the Gibbs case is particularly relevant. So I'm going 6 7 to sustain the defendant's objection to that application. That exhausts your objections, correct, Mr. Fisher? 8 9 MR. FISHER: That is correct, your Honor. Thank 09:25:01 10 you. 11 THE COURT: Counsel, if you could turn to Page 11 12 of the presentence report, and let's review where we are in light of that -- those two rulings by the Court. 13 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, may I use my laptop? 14 09:25:15 15 THE COURT: Oh, sure. You can tell the 16 generational difference between myself, who is dealing with 17 paper, and a lawyer who is, shall we say, slightly younger 18 than me, dealing with a computer. 19 MR. FISHER: I've got my book as well, your Honor. 09:25:40 20 I think we are at Offense Level 9. 21 THE COURT: Okay. All right. We have got a base 22 and I'm starting at Paragraph 54, we have a Base Level of 6. 23 We have got the application of Paragraph 55. I overruled 24 the defendant's objection to that. That gets us to Offense 09:26:01 25 Level 10, because of the directive if the resulting offense

1 level is less than 10, four levels are added, so that gets 2 I sustained the objection to 56. The obstruction us to 10. 3 objection gets us to 12. And under those circumstances, third level doesn't apply. So the adjusted Offense Level 4 5 would be 12, after acceptance, it becomes 10. So the 09:26:28 6 quideline range after the disposition of the defendant's 7 objections becomes 10/I. And let me see if the parties 8 concur. 9 MR. KESSLER: I do, your Honor. MR. FISHER: I do as well, your Honor. 09:26:50 10 11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 12 That makes the advisory guideline range six to twelve months. 13 14 The Court's had the benefit of the government's 09:27:08 15 sentencing memorandum, which is ECF 65, the defendant's 16 sentencing memorandum at 66. The Court has also reviewed 17 the report from the mental health professionals of the 18 Bureau of Prisons as well as the other documentation which 19 has been attached to everyone's memos. 09:27:32 20 So with that, Mr. Kessler, allocution on behalf of 2.1 the government. 22 MR. KESSLER: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. 23 Well, we have all seen how often this sort of thing 2.4 comes up, often and more tragic circumstances nowadays. 09:27:46 25 we all know that when all of the signs are there that

somebody is planning to commit a mass shooting or a bombing, we have to take it seriously. And I think in a case where somebody is preparing, training, arming themselves, it's deadly serious, and that's what we have in this case. This defendant repeatedly went out and tried to get semi-automatic weapons, actually got a Glock pistol at one point, tried to buy all the ammunition in a store at another point. One semi-automatic assault weapon after another. He was training at various gun ranges, trying to make a bomb at home.

Now, do we think he actually belongs to Al-Qaeda or espouses some sort of radical Islamic motivation just because he had that material? No. They just had the best schematics for a bomb out on the internet that you could get. Do we think he's some kind of white supremacist because he asked his aunt to get him a copy of Mein Kampf? Probably not. But all the research shows people who want to commit mass shootings are looking for excuses or validation, some framework to make them think they are something other than a mad man who wants to hurt people.

We don't know exactly what the motivation was. We do know he was interested in committing an act of mass violence. He researched it constantly, talked about it with people who have interviewed him, and then he was going out and was actually preparing to do it.

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Now, the defense has said that this is basically a thought crime. They said he had no criminal history, so can't hold that against him. And it was legal for him to purchase a firearm. I want to hit on each of those things.

First off, the idea that this just a thought crime, that everything he did other than the actual lie at the end shouldn't count against him. The fact that either thoughts as opposed to actions beforehand doesn't mean they are irrelevant, and you can see that in all kinds of other contexts. It's perfectly legal, for example, to set up offshore accounts in places like the Bahamas or whatever, but it would be relevant in a case where somebody was committing a financial fraud scheme.

Now, this guy is a college graduate. He had no criminal history, and it was legal for him to have guns. All those things are true. Again, they do not negate what his intent was. If you look at the cases like this where things went wrong; Dylann Roof, 21 years old, close to the same age as this defendant, no criminal history until he shot ten people at a Charleston church with a legally purchased firearm. Nikolus Cruz, 21 years old, no criminal history, until he shot 34 people at Parkland High School, with a legally purchased gun. Stephen Paddock, a successful businessman, no criminal history, until he shot 500 people from a window in Las Vegas, with legally purchased guns.

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And finally, Timothy McVeigh, decorated veteran, no criminal history, until he blew up the federal building in Oklahoma The public was never harmed up until then, that's City. And it's true in every one of these cases, until it wasn't. And in this case, the public wasn't harmed because the FBI had to follow him around for months. They had a GPS tracker on his car. They had people driving around following him, watching him everywhere he went, and were able to intervene at key moments like when he actually got a Glock semi-automatic pistol. That is why the public was never harmed, not because he didn't mean it. Now he is saying at this point that he didn't mean to do it, and he was never going to hurt anybody, but I know this Court's been around a long time, we have heard that before. People have intent that is very different from what they say their intent was when they are in here for sentencing. Suddenly, I was never going to do it. I didn't mean it. Do we trust that? Can we? I think we have to look at his behavior, and not the words he is saying at his sentencing when he's motivated to downplay it. Every time a federal firearms licensee refused to

Every time a federal firearms licensee refused to sell him a gun, he went to another one. He would go to another town, if he got stopped. He would go to another state, if he got stopped. Those are not the actions of somebody who didn't mean to do anything. That's an awful

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lot of preparation and trouble to put yourself to if you were just looking for attention.

When his training got stopped in the middle here, he went to Ohio to try and find another place where he could go shoot and train on a semi-automatic weapon. When the FBI kept getting in the way, and got him to surrender his gun, he started making one in his basement, and he started making a bomb in his basement.

The defense wants you to believe, and what he is trying to say now, is that he was just looking for attention. Well, he got attention, that's true. But a lot of what he was doing is exactly the opposite of what you would do if you were just looking for attention. If you want attention, you go on Twitter, and you start talking all the time about what you are going to do. You post it on-line, you go talk about it in a public square. He was doing things surreptitiously, like trying to go to another state to get firearms training, trying to go to another FFL that hadn't blocked him yet to try and get a gun, and then making weapons in the basement. Those are not cries for attention, that's trying to hide your preparations to go ahead and actually do it.

Now, as to the fact that he admitted his conduct, yes, he got acceptance of responsibility, because he admitted lying to the FBI. Pretty hard to get away from

that when he did it in front of a whole lot of officers and agents. But he— Has he really accepted what he has done? And we can feel confident that he is not going to do it again? I would say we really can't. And one of the recordings that came up before from the jail was when he actually said, and I cited this in my sentencing memo, when he is talking to his aunt Sheryl, he just— and I'll leave out the curse words, but he basically said, "I don't understand this. All I did was lie to them. What is the big deal?" That's how he really feels. He understands he lied to the FBI and we could prove it, so he had to admit it, but that doesn't mean that he has internalized that what he was doing was wrong.

Now, the defendant is arguing that supervision in this case is enough. Just watching him, trying to make sure that, you know, he stays on the—stays on the path that's going to be enough to protect public safety. The FBI was following him around, as I mentioned, for months, with GPS trackers on him, interviewing people he had interacted with, and it still didn't stop him from going on and doing it more. Probation doesn't have those kind of resources. As hard as they work, and as talented as they are, they can't sit on him all the time. Having him at home, that's where he was making a gun, that's where he was making a bomb.

Putting a monitor on him to make sure he doesn't leave the

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house, even that's not going to be enough, because that last firearm he was making, he was making from parts he ordered over the internet. So unless they are going to intercept and open all his packages, even that is not enough.

The only real guarantee that he is not going to hurt anybody for some considerable period of time is while he is incarcerated, where he is also hopefully going to get some mental health treatment and come to grips with what he's done. But that is the key 3553(a) factor here.

Now, I do think the nature and circumstances of the offense and his characteristics are important as well. Especially, I think, in light of, you know, some of the objections we just dealt with. I understand, you know, the Court's ruling on not enhancing his sentence for the firearm, based on the Gibbs case, but that doesn't mean we can't consider it as part of the nature and circumstances of the offense. And I think it's still fair to say that it is different if he had been lying about an insurance contract or he had been lying about paying his taxes. He was lying about having and making guns that were intended for mass murder, and I think that's important that we look at the big picture here.

The defendant would like to say this is just a thought crime. But again, that's not what we have here. The public safety interest is really key, and it's always

just thoughts until somebody actually goes out and does it. 1 With this defendant, his acts show that what he was up to 2 3 was not just thoughts. It demonstrated that he wanted to go out and commit a mass murder. And the evidence proves he 4 5 knows how to do it, and his preparations were under way. 09:35:39 6 Public safety demands, your Honor, he can be 7 somewhere where he can't hurt anyone for as long as possible. 8 9 Thank you, sir. THE COURT: Mr. Fisher. 09:35:50 10 11 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, the government can't foist 12 their multitude of failures in mass shooting cases or change the law about firearms on the back of Mr. Fein's sentence. 13 14 Unfortunately, that is what they are tying to do here. 09:36:04 15 fact of the matter is that Mr. Fein lied to officers to 16 avoid being sent back to a mental health hospital. He is 17 begging repeatedly on the recording, which I'm happy to play 18 for the Court, that he not be sent back to a mental health 19 hospital. He is not lying to the officer to avoid detection 09:36:20 20 for planning a mass attack. And the government wants you to 2.1 believe that he actually did intend and plan to, despite all 22 of the interviews, all of the conversations, all of the 23 discussions he had with multiple agents, where he failed at

any point to notify them of any plan to attack anybody.

worst thing he did in this case is engage in internet

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1 trolling, which the Pope addressed on his ash Wednesday 2 speech as a persistent problem that our world has to deal 3 Mr. Fein is not unique in being alienated and being somewhat disappointed in his career prospects. He is not 4 5 unique in saying inflammatory things on the internet. 09:36:55 6 Certainly that's a problem for all of us to deal with in 7 this technological age. Mr. Fein lied to a law enforcement officer to avoid 8 9 being hospitalized in a place that he did not want to go. He didn't lie because he was concealing his affinity for 09:37:10 10 11 people who felt alienated. He admitted that every time he 12 was talked to by the border patrol, by FBI, by Homeland 13 Security, by the local tasks force agents. He admitted to 14 them freely that he felt sympathy for people who were 09:37:28 15 alienated. Your Honor, I'm a criminal defense attorney, my 16 job is to feel sympathy for people that are alienated. 17 Fein never planned to attack anybody or hurt anybody. 18 THE COURT: Well, that's what he asserts. But what 19 actions did he take? What about the purchase of the vice at 09:37:46 20 the Lowe's or Home Depot or wherever it was? 2.1 MR. FISHER: I don't think there is anything 22 illegal or questionable about a person purchasing these 23 items. 24 THE COURT: No. In the context of everything else 09:37:54 25 that's going on in this case, Mr. Fisher, what impact, if at

all, do you think the purchase of the vice has, because the 1 2 vice is necessary to convert the other components that he is 3 already -- that he already has, right? 4 MR. FISHER: Right. THE COURT: So what impact do you think that should 5 09:38:12 6 have? 7 MR. FISHER: In all honesty, your Honor, I think 8 it's completely irrelevant. I don't think it has any 9 bearing whatsoever on the facts of this case. I think Mr. Fein's ability to or plan to build a firearm, which may or 09:38:21 10 11 may not have developed prior to or after the Probate Court's 12 order, has no bearing on what he actually planned to do here. 13 14 THE COURT: What do you make of the jail recording 09:38:33 15 where he basically says, "What's the big deal about lying to 16 the FBI?" Does that auger well for compliance moving forward? 17 18 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I would attribute that to 19 largely to Mr. Fein's mental health issues that we are well 09:38:48 20 versed in after dealing with this case. There are multiple 2.1 records, multiple conversations before he was ever charged 22 with any crime, and subsequent records indicating he has a 23 profound mental health disorder. That statement came before 2.4 he even received treatment from the Bureau of Prisons, as 09:39:04 25 far as I'm aware. And my understanding now is that Mr. Fein

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is medicated. He is compliant with the medication that was recommended. And aside from his transfer from Newaygo to here which interrupted his medication, he is now in a much calmer state. People say things on jail recordings all the time that I have to listen to, some of them are inflammatory, some of them are blowing off steam. may or may not be in the same state that he was in when he made those statements. My belief is that the medication and the treatment he has received since making those statements has had an impact on his ability to comport himself with the requirements of the law. That he understands now if the Court orders any mental health treatment, orders any medication to be taken, that he has to comply with those requirements or he will be sent back to jail. My option here, my proposed solution to this case affords the Court with ultimate latitude to re-sentence Mr. Fein to what the government is suggesting, if Mr. Fein steps out of line one If he fails to take his medication, if he fails to go to out-patient treatment, if he fails to go to in-patient treatment, if he orders something he shouldn't order on the internet, the Court can sentence him to the maximum extent of the law, but to suggest that because of what the government thinks he might be planning to do, he deserves a five-year prison sentence, is a tragedy of justice, and I cannot stress that any more than I am right now. It would

1 be completely inconsistent with the proportionality requirements of the sentencing guidelines and with the 2 3 actual offense conduct in this case, which again, was Mr. Fein lying to avoid, at that time, being sent back to a 4 5 mental health facility. 09:40:30 6 THE COURT: What do you make of the encryption of 7 the computer? 8 MR. FISHER: After he had already been--9 THE COURT: In the context of everything else that 09:40:39 10 was going on? 11 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, it's hard for me to 12 describe the weirdness and how I feel about these particular facts. 13 14 At no time during the course of this investigation 09:40:50 15 was Mr. Fein doing anything illegal. He is allowed to 16 encrypt his computer. He is allowed to do all these things. 17 The government's investigation appears to have been spurred 18 merely by fear. And I don't know what law he violated to 19 justify it, frankly. I understand there are concerns here. 09:41:07 20 I understand people have done horrible things. But 2.1 repeatedly during these conversations, Mr. Fein is giving them access to his property, giving them access to his 22 23 computer, admitting his affinity for people with, I would 24 say dubious reputations, to say the least, and they have not 09:41:22 25 been cut off in any way. Even if he encrypted his computer,

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he was also giving them his cell phone, giving them his laptop, and allowing them to image the entire thing. So I'm not sure that the fact that he had at some point encrypted it really means anything. He was at every turn turning over the property until the Probate Court ordered him not to possess firearms, which is the central issue that caused this crime to happen in the first place.

I don't think that any of the tertiary issues the government has identified as warranting concern are justified, and I think the government's proposed solution is inconsistent with the massive government intervention that already occurred in this place.

I do believe that probation can handle managing Mr. Fein's internet activity. I believe they can manage handling his cell phone activity. They can manage handling his mail. Those aren't things that are too far beyond the tools of the government. And if this Court agrees with me and sentences him to probation, one step out of line lands Mr. Fein back in a prison, to the fullest extent that it's available to the Court. It's a just sentence. It's a reasonable sentence within the guidelines, I think at this point, since he has already served that much time in prison or in jail.

THE COURT: This is new information regarding his taking of prescribed medication.

1 MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: When did that start? 3 MR. FISHER: That started probably right around the time he came back and I noted that he was not taking his 4 medication. 5 09:42:39 6 THE COURT: Came back from the examination? 7 MR. FISHER: Yes. It would have been after the PSI. 8 9 THE COURT: Up until then, he wasn't taking medication as prescribed, correct? 09:42:49 10 11 MR. FISHER: That is correct, your Honor. One of 12 his diagnoses is anti-social personality disorder with schizoid features. My understanding from dealing with 13 14 mental health disorders throughout my career, is that schizophrenia, schizoid personality disorders, 09:43:00 15 16 schizoaffective disorders all have a host of co-occurring 17 symptoms, one of them is an inability to comprehend that you 18 need help. He seems, in his, I think based upon his 19 intelligence and his ability to logically work through this 09:43:17 20 process with me, working together on this issue, has been able to realize he needs to take this medication if for 21 22 nothing else than to address the concerns of the Court and the concerns of probation while he is on any supervision. 23 2.4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. 09:43:31 25 MR. FISHER: Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Fein, is there anything you wish to 2 say in your own behalf, sir? You may proceed as you wish. 3 THE DEFENDANT: First off, I just want to say I'm sorry that I made the false statement. I'm sorry for my 4 5 I didn't-- I never wanted things to end up like 09:43:55 this. I never wanted things to go this far. I'm sorry for 6 7 violating the Probate Court order. Usually I listen to people, and I didn't listen to 8 9 the judge when he told me to not possess firearms and to not -- and to take my medication and comply with treatment. 09:44:43 10 11 I should have listened to him. I would like to think that 12 usually I respect what people say and I have the ability to 13 listen to what they have to say, and that I'm respectful, 14 and that I am able to defer to what they have-- they want me 09:45:12 15 to do when I think that they are right, and that I need to listen to them. 16 17 THE COURT: Have you concluded or did you want to 18 go on? Go ahead. Take your time. 19 THE DEFENDANT: And I accept responsibility for the 09:45:55 20 crime, and I'm sorry. You know, I didn't want-- I 2.1 consistently didn't believe I needed to take medication, and 22 then when I was in Newaygo, my lawyer was the one who

convinced me to try taking the pills, and I am able to

listen to what other people have to say and defer to them

when I feel like I don't have the solution or I don't know

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how to solve the problem. That's it. 1 2 THE COURT: Have you concluded, sir? THE DEFENDANT: (Nodding.) 3 THE COURT: He is nodding his head yes. 4 5 MR. KESSLER: Your Honor, can I address one thing 09:46:55 he said? 6 7 THE COURT: Sure. 8 MR. KESSLER: I think it's noteworthy he said, "I 9 can conform my behavior to what other people want me to do when I think they are right." The Kent County court told 09:47:04 10 11 him not to have guns. He did it anyway. And the FBI told 12 him again and again and again not to have guns, and he went 13 ahead with it anyway. I don't think we can take his word 14 for it. 09:47:17 15 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Fisher? 16 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I can't stress enough, 17 when the FBI asked for his gun, he gave to them, at a time 18 when he was under no legal obligation to do so. 19 conformed in every step except for the violation of his 09:47:30 20 Probate Court order with the requirements and confines of 2.1 the law. That's what we have to deal with here today, the 22 law, not what we think Mr. Fein was going to do maybe. 23 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 24 It is the Court's duty to impose a sentence 09:47:42 25 sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S. Code 3553(a).

The Court recognizes the guidelines are advisory to the Court, but I have taken the guideline into account as an initial benchmark or starting point when sentencing in this case.

I recognize I must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. The guideline range is one of the array of factors warranting consideration.

I also fully recognize my discretion in determining an appropriate sentence as recognized by the United States

Supreme Court in its decisions in Booker, Kimbrough, Rita,
Gall, Spears, and the Sixth Circuit case of Herrera-Zuniga.

Pursuant to <u>Tapia vs. The United States</u>, at 131

Supreme Court 2382, the Court recognizes that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting correction and rehabilitation.

I have considered all of the defendant's arguments in support of his request for a lower sentence.

The 3553 factors are the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. The sentence must reflect the seriousness of the offense; promote respect for law; provide just punishment for the offense; afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from further crimes of the

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defendant; provide the defendant with needed medical, educational, and/or correctional treatment; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarly situated defendants; any guideline policy statements that pertain; and the kinds of sentences available to the Court.

First, as is obvious from this record, the Court recommends that the defendant receive mental health treatment and counseling while he is incarcerated. That seems to me is the absolute priority for the time that Mr. Fein is going to be incarcerated within the Bureau of Prisons, that he work with his mental health treatment providers and come to understand the circumstances under which he committed this offense. The commission of the relevant conduct, which I think has some major import in determining a sentence in this case, and hopefully he can come back to this community and be a law abiding citizen while on supervised release.

The offense of conviction, of course, is a 1001 violation of Title 18. The advisory guideline range is six to twelve months. The relevant conduct here is significant involving, number one, defiance of a state court order, which is properly evaluated, in the Court's judgment, by the application of four levels to the base offense level. Mr. Fein was not deterred by inquiries by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The record reflects what I would

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refer to as a dogged search for firearms when he was prohibited from having them, "because he was told not to."

There were multiple attempts, the purchase of the kit and the tools, especially the vice, to convert the parts that he had already is particularly aggravating in the Court's judgment, and aggravates the offense conduct as far as relevant conduct is concerned.

In addition to that, we have got additional obstructive behavior, soliciting a fellow inmate to make a call to his aunt to destroy evidence or secrete evidence and, of course, Mr. Fein probably wasn't thinking about it, but that placed his aunt potentially, and his cellmate in difficult circumstances vis-a-vis the Federal Bureau of Investigation in terms of doing things that might be obstructing an investigation. I'm not suggesting that occurred, but the potentiality for it, when you make that sort of request, is significant indeed. But given that element, the Court finds that two levels for obstruction is not sufficient. This is aggravating enough, in the Court's judgment, that a departure, because two levels doesn't adequately reflect the obstructive nature of the defendant's conduct, and the seriousness of that behavior. In the Court's judgment, that requires a departure upward two levels from the advisory guideline range.

Possession of the firearm parts in conjunction

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with— for the purpose of constructing an AR-15, and the defendant expressed an intention to do it, in that context, the Court finds that that conduct which in the Court's judgment is relevant conduct for the Court to consider, is not taken into the guidelines as scored. Accordingly, a departure pursuant to 5K2.0(a)(2)(B) is appropriate, and the Court intends to depart upward two levels for that reason also.

Now, as far as the 3553 factors are concerned, specific deterrence of Mr. Fein is a significant factor for the Court to consider here. I recognize he might be in a different place, based on the good advice he has gotten from Mr. Fisher, and the fact that he is now understanding his need to take medication, but specific deterrence of Mr. Fein is a significant factor for the Court to consider. At this point in time, the Court views him as a significant risk to the public. And in addition to that, the Court must fashion a sentence which promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, and reflects the seriousness of the offense behavior, as well as relevant conduct.

Fortunately for Mr. Fein, he's got support in the community from his aunt who raised him. And hopefully he will lean on those pro-social individuals when he is released from confinement. But given the nature of the relevant conduct here, the Court believes that a variance

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upward of two levels is also appropriate for the reasons that I have-- for the reasons that I have stated.

Accordingly, the Court finds after the departure applications and the variance application, that the appropriate guideline range is properly evaluated at Offense Level 16, Criminal History Category I, which results in an advisory guideline range of 21 to 27 months. And it's the Court's intention to sentence Mr. Fein at the top end of that range, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the other factors that the Court has laid out on this record.

Accordingly, it's the judgment of the Court the defendant is committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 27 months.

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of three years.

Within 72 hours of release from custody of the Bureau of Prisons, the defendant shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which he is released.

While on supervised release, the defendant shall comply with the mandatory and standard conditions of supervision, including DNA collection and drug testing.

Additionally, the defendant shall comply with the following

special conditions of supervision:

Participate in a program of mental health treatment as directed, and follow the rules of the program until such time as he is released from the program by his probation officer, and pay at least a portion of the cost according to his ability to pay, as determined by his probation officer.

He is not to possess any firearm. He is not to have any components of a firearm or components to make explosives while he is on supervised release, and he is not to possess any component of any dangerous weapon while he is on supervised release. It is the Court's intention here to write a condition of supervised release, which is broader than just a reference to firearm, components of firearms, anything having to do with explosives, the defendant is prohibited from possessing.

If he is unemployed after the first 60 days of supervision or for 60 days after termination or layoff from employment, he must perform at least 20 hours of community service per week as directed until he is gainfully employed full-time.

He will be monitored on home detention for the first 12 months of supervision. During that time, he must abide by all technological requirements, location monitoring program rules, and pay all or part of the cost of participation in location monitoring program, as directed by

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his probation -- by his probation officer.

He is restricted to his residence at all times except for employment, education, religious service, medical, substance abuse, or mental health treatment, attorney visits, court appearances, court ordered obligations, or other activities as pre-approved by his probation officer.

He must use only computers and computer-related devices which are approved in advance by his probation officer.

He must provide his probation officer with all user names, email addresses, passwords, social media accounts, and other forms of internet identification, and must not create additional accounts unless approved in advance by his probation officer.

He must participate in the computer internet monitoring program, and must comply with the rules of the program as directed by his probation officer.

He must pay the cost of computer monitoring, as directed by his probation officer, and advise anyone in his household or any business entity that he might have contact with, that the computers may be subject to computer monitoring. He must provide all computer related billing records, including but not limited to telephone, cell phone, cable, internet, as directed by his probation officer.

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1 Refusal to comply will be a violation of supervision. 2 must warn anyone with whom he shares a residence that the 3 premises is subject to search pursuant to this condition. He must submit his person, property, house, 4 5 residence, vehicle, papers, computers, and other electronic 09:59:16 6 devices to a search conducted by the United States Probation 7 Office. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. He must warn other occupants of the 8 9 premises where he lives or works that the premises is subject to search pursuant to this condition. The probation 09:59:31 10 11 officer may conduct a search under this condition only when 12 reasonable suspicion exists that he has violated a condition of supervision, and that the areas to be searched contain 13 14 evidence of the violation. Any search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. 09:59:48 15 16 The special assessment of \$100 is ordered due and payable immediately. 17 18 The Court does not intend to impose a fine in this 19 case. 09:59:59 20 Mr. Fisher, any other recommendations to the Bureau 2.1 of Prisons that you would like? 22 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I would ask that the Court 23 send Mr. Fein to Butner. He has already got treatment there 24 or closer mental health treatment facilities he can 10:00:14 25 maintain--

1 THE COURT: I'm not picking you up, sir. 2 sorry. 3 MR. FISHER: Sorry, your Honor. Mr. Fein was previously housed at Butner, which is 4 a mental health facility in North Carolina. I think he 10:00:20 5 would like to be housed closer to his family so they can 6 7 visit him. I'm not sure if there's one closer besides 8 Chicago. 9 THE COURT: I view the mental health recommendation as the absolute first priority here, so I'll put close to 10:00:32 10 11 home as possible, but I'm going to clearly make it part of 12 the judgment that I believe that the mental health placement is the most important. 13 14 Mr. Fisher, any legal objection to the sentence 10:00:47 15 imposed, other than those already placed on the record? 16 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, there were two points that 17 I didn't catch. I did catch two points for the vice and two 18 points for the further obstructive behavior. What was the 19 third? 10:01:00 20 THE COURT: The variance upward considering the 21 3553 factors. 22 MR. FISHER: Okay. Your Honor, we would object to 23 the upward variance in this case, the 3553 factors, the 2.4 guidelines, and the obstructive conduct. 10:01:17 25 Thank you, sir. THE COURT:

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                      Are you satisfied that I have addressed all of your
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             arguments?
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                      MR. FISHER: I am, your Honor.
                      THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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                      Mr. Kessler, any legal objection to the sentence
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             imposed?
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                      MR. KESSLER: No.
                                          I just want to clarify this.
             think Mr. Fisher and I might be thinking the same thing.
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             Just for the record, I expect Mr. Fisher to appeal, those
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             first two were guideline departures and then the last two
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             essentially a variance of the equivalent of two levels?
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                      THE COURT: Correct.
                      MR. KESSLER: Is that what the Court's saying?
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                      THE DEFENDANT: Correct. I tried to make that
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             clear but.
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                      MR. KESSLER: Well, we said two levels, and I can
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             see him maybe coming back saying the guideline range was now
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             21 to 27. There is difference between departure versus
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             variance.
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                      THE COURT: Effectively I departed and I varied
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             upward six levels to 16/I.
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                      MR. KESSLER: Right. But the last one equivalent
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             of two levels?
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                      THE COURT: Correct.
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                      MR. KESSLER:
                                     Thank you.
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1 THE COURT: You're welcome. 2 Mr. Fein, I advise you--3 Oh, counts to be dismissed, Mr. Kessler? 4 MR. KESSLER: Count Two, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Count Two is dismissed pursuant to the 10:02:10 plea agreement. 6 7 Mr. Fein, I advise you, sir, you can appeal your conviction if you believe that your guilty plea was somehow 8 9 unlawful or involuntary, or if there is some other fundamental defect in the proceeding not waived by your 10:02:20 10 11 quilty plea. 12 You also have a statutory right to appeal your sentence under certain circumstances, particularly if you 13 think the sentence is contrary to law. 14 10:02:31 15 You have the right to apply for leave to appeal in 16 forma pauperis if you are poor. If you wish to do so, with 17 a few exceptions, you need to file the appropriate documents within 14 days of the entry of the judgment in this case. 18 19 Your attorney will prepare and file notice of appeal upon 10:02:45 20 your request. 2.1 Counsel is advised of his obligation to advise his 22 client of his appellate rights. Should your client wish to 23 pursue an appeal, the forms for filing an appeal can be 24 found on this Court's website or the Court of Appeals' 10:02:57 25 website. Should your client choose to appeal, you're

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             obligated to continue representation of him until such time
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             as you are specifically relieved by the Court of Appeals.
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                       Anything further in this matter, Mr. Kessler?
                       MR. KESSLER: No, your Honor.
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                       THE COURT: Mr. Fisher?
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                       MR. FISHER: No, your Honor.
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                       THE COURT: Mr. Fein, work with your mental health
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             professionals, sir.
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                       Good luck to you.
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                       Defendant is remanded to the custody of the marshal
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             for execution of sentence.
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                       COURT CLERK: All rise, please.
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                       Court is in recess.
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                   (At 10:03 a.m., proceedings concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE I, Kathleen S. Thomas, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of proceedings had in the within-entitled and numbered cause on the date hereinbefore set forth; and I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction. /s/ Kathleen S. Thomas, CSR-1300, RPR U.S. District Court Reporter 410 West Michigan Kalamazoo, Michigan 2.4